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Placating ‘worried nationalists’ may be key to the pro-EU side
winning a referendum on the UK’s relationship with Europe.
by Blog Admin
The chances of a referendum being held on the UK’s membership of the European Union
have increased significantly in recent months. Based on a study for the European Council on
Foreign Relations, Peter Kellner, President of the polling organisation YouGov, assesses
how a referendum on EU membership might play out in practice. A large percentage of the UK
population – which he terms ‘worried nationalists’ – are likely to oppose EU membership on the
basis of general values concerning Britain’s place in the world. Encouraging these individuals
to think more pragmatically about the UK’s relationship with Europe would likely be crucial for
the pro-EU campaign.
In a democracy, public opinion always matters; but Brit ish attitudes to Europe matter more than usual. This
is partly because a ref erendum on Britain and the EU in the next f ew years is a distinct possibility; partly
because Europe is an especially divisive issue on the polit ical Right, with the United Kingdom Independence
Party threatening to overtake the Conservatives at the European Parliament elections in 2014; and partly
because any major change in the way the EU works requires the consent of  all EU members, so Britain has
a veto – and all the main parties have promised that they will wield the veto unless they have public
consent.
YouGov has conducted f resh research f or the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) into the
roots of  Brit ish attitudes to Europe. It f inds that the attitudes of  millions of  voters to the EU are intimately
linked to their view of  Britain itself , to their view of  how our society is evolving, and extent to which they
want Britain to engage with the rest of  the world generally. We asked people to consider eight pairs of
statements and say, in each case, which they agreed with more. Two pairs explored attitudes to Britain;
another two, recent and f uture trends about lif e in Britain; two looked at att itudes to the world as a whole;
the f inal two specif ically considered Britain and Europe. The f ull results can be viewed here.
Dif f erent people will f ind signif icance
in dif f erent f indings: the widespread
pessimism about the prospects f or the
next generation, f or example, or the
popularity of  Brit ish tradit ions, or the
divided views about whether Britain
should work especially closely with the
rest of  Europe; or – most relevant to
this analysis – the two-to-one majority
regarding the EU as f undamentally a
f ailure rather than a success.
However, the main reason f or asking
these questions together is to explore
the connections among these
attitudes. How f ar, if  at all, do our
attitudes to the EU f low f rom specif ic
concerns about the way Brussels
works, and how f ar f rom views about
the state of  Britain itself  and/or our optimism or pessimism towards the f uture and/or our wider sense of
whether Britain should engage with the rest of  the world or try to keep it at bay?
Looking at our survey data, the strongest correlations with att itudes to the EU concern Britain’s general
place in the world. Supporters of  overseas aid tend to be pro-EU; opponents of  overseas aid are
overwhelmingly anti-EU. The correlation coef f icient between the two is 0.5 – which statisticians consider a
high f igure. It ’s a similar story, with almost exactly the same coef f icient, when we compare attitudes to the
EU with those to Britain’s place in the world generally. The more strongly people agree with the view that
Britain must work closely with global organisations such as the United Nations, the more likely they are to
be pro-EU.
There is also a clear, though lesser, correlation between how we view the EU and whether we think Britain
has grown better or worse in the past 30-40 years. By three-to-one, pro-EU respondents think Britain has
improved, while by f ive-to-three, those who regard the EU as a f ailure think Britain has got worse. The
correlation is 0.3. A similar f igure applies when we compare expectations f or the f uture, and whether or not
our children’s generation will be better of f  than ours: Those who are pro-EU divide evenly between
optimists and pessimists, while those who are anti-EU are overwhelmingly pessimistic.
This correlation analysis takes us some way down the track of  understanding the dif f erent f orces at work
on public att itudes to Europe. But we need to delve f urther, f or these f orces are not wholly independent of
each other. For example, supporters of  overseas aid are more likely than opponents to be optimists. One
way to analyse these f actors together is to do cluster analysis. The computer examines the pattern of
responses, and creates clusters of  broadly like-minded respondents. When we do this, we f ind that most
Britons belong to one of  three groups:
Worried nationalists (WNs): 42 per cent. They tend to have a tradit ional view of  Britain, are pessimistic
about the f uture and, were Britain a castle surrounded by a moat, would want the drawbridge up most of
the time, in order to keep the rest of  the world at bay. They tend to dislike overseas aid and think Britain
should not bother too much with the global bodies such as the United Nations. The vast majority of  them
think the EU has been a f ailure.
WNs divide evenly between Labour and Conservatives; 15 per cent of  them support UKIP (twice the national
average) and just 5 per cent are Liberal Democrats (half  the national average). They are slightly more likely
than the general population to be women and to read the Sun or the Mail, and less likely to have a
university degree.
Pragmatic nationalists (PNs): 23 per cent. Like the WNs, PNs tend to have a tradit ional view of  Britain, but
tend to be less pessimistic about the way Britain is heading. They are divided about the merits of  overseas
aid, but tend to think Britain does need to co-operate with global institutions. Were Britain a castle, they
would lower the drawbridge more of ten than the WNs, to allow more contact with the outside world. They
are divided on whether the EU has been successf ul, but tend not to have strong f eelings either way.
PNs also divide evenly between Labour and Conservative. The share of  Liberal Democrats is in line with the
national average; but only 3 per cent would vote UKIP. Otherwise, their demographic prof ile is similar to that
of  Britain as a whole.
Progressive internationalists (PIs): 25 per cent. Here, “progressive” is used not so much as a lef t-of -
centre label, but in the sense of  holding a view that history tends towards greater prosperity and
enlightenment. Their view of  Britain tends to be rooted in values more than tradit ion; they generally think
Britain is a better place today than was a generation ago but are less certain about the f uture.
Overwhelmingly, PIs think Britain must play a f ull role in global institutions, most support our international
aid programme and, by three-to-one, they think the EU is a success story. They are happy f or the
drawbridge linking Britain to the rest of  the world to stay down.
Two-thirds of  PIs would vote Labour (52 per cent) or Lib Dem (14 per cent); just 23 per cent would vote
Conservative. They are more likely than the national average to be men, to have university degrees and to
read the ‘broadsheet’ newspapers.
It should be stressed that these groups are not completely
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It should be stressed that these groups are not completely
homogeneous; and there are another 10 per cent of  the
electorate that don’t f it any of  them (though this last group
tends to have no clear views of  these issues, and f ew of  them
are likely to vote in any election or ref erendum). Even within
each group, there are some people who f it most but by no
means all of  the descriptions given. For example, there are
internationally-minded optimists who reject the tradit ional view
of  Brit ish lif e and approve of  overseas aid, but still dislike the
EU. However, there aren’t very many of  them.
The broader lesson is that those who seek to persuade
Britons either to love or to hate Brussels by stressing the
precise wording of  EU treaties, or the details of  the Common
Agricultural Policy, or the merits of  the Working Time Directive,
are wasting their t ime. Few people think about the EU in these
terms; and the f ew who do are probably committed enthusiasts
f or, or utterly hostile to, the whole project; so their votes are
locked up. For most people, att itudes to the EU are shaped by
two broad things: their view of  Britain itself , and how f ar they
are at ease with the direction in which our society is heading. As
with so much else in polit ics, f ear is a big driver of  public
attitudes. At the moment, the f ear f actor is working hard f or the EU’s opponents.
Implications of the Analysis
First, Worried Nationalists comprise by f ar the biggest single group. In a ref erendum on whether to leave
the EU, Worried Nationalists give the anti-EU lobby a head start. Although they could be outvoted if  virtually
all the Pragmatic Nationalists lined up against them with the Progressive Internationalists, I f ind it hard in
practice to see how the Brit ish would vote to stay in the EU unless a f air number of  nationalists could be
lured f rom the “worried” to the “pragmatic” column.
Although we don’t have this kind of  data f or 1975, there can be litt le doubt that this is a big part of  what
happened 37 years ago. Many voters who started out both disliking the Common Market and f earf ul of
Britain’s f uture, ended up f earing that Britain would be worse of f  out in the cold. They decided on pragmatic
grounds to swallow their dislike of  “Europe” and vote to stay in. If  an in-out ref erendum is held in the next
f ew years, the pro-EU lobby will need to achieve the same shif t and change the way the f ear f actor works.
Secondly, if  the WN column can be reduced to, say, 35 per cent or less in a ref erendum campaign, then the
PNs will become the swing group. Their votes will decide whether Britain leaves the EU or stays in. As in
1975, the f ear f actor will loom large. But this is part of  a wider point. By its nature, pragmatism is concerned
more with practical and of ten short- term outcomes, rather than big visions and long-term dreams. PNs are
unlikely to be swayed either by those who summon the spirits of  Shakespeare, Agincourt and Elizabeth I –
or by those who wax lyrical about peace in Europe and the continent’s shared cultural heritage. “Rule
Britannia” and “Ode to Joy” might stir the partisans, but they will leave the pragmatists cold. To them, the
big picture will matter f ar more: which is more likely to boost jobs, prosperity and our children’s f uture:
maintaining our partnership with our European neighbours or arranging a divorce?
In short, campaigning by both sides is likely to be scrappy and negative. It may be the least bad way to
decide Britain’s relations with the rest of  Europe, but only a wild optimist could think it a glorious way.
This article was first published on the European Council on Foreign Relations website and has an
accompanying PDF report.
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